(CNSNews.com) –The federal Centers for Disease Control has taken “limited action” to improve security around labs that house deadly pathogens, but it lacks a plan to make other needed changes to protect those labs from terrorism, the Government Accountability Office said this week.
 
In a report released Sept. 22, the government watchdog said CDC had taken “limited action” to improve perimeter security to comply with recommendations made by the GAO in July that exposed vulnerabilities terrorists could exploit.
 
The report explained that in 2008, GAO investigated all five of the nation’s labs categorized at Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4), the highest security level that CDC imposes to prevent the outbreak of pathogens like the deadly Ebola virus. But two labs were found to lack some of the 15 security controls that GAO evaluated.
 
The “significant lack of these controls” includes limited camera coverage of building entrances and no screenings for vehicles that enter the premises.
 
As CNSNews.com previously reported, a bipartisan congressional commission on the prevention of terrorism elaborated on the GAO’s 2008 findings and its implications for potential acts of bioterrorism. 

Members of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, chaired by former Sens. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) and Jim Talent (R-Mo.), wrote about the GAO findings in their 2008 report, “World at Risk.” 

At an Atlanta lab, both the commission and the GAO noted: “(GAO investigators) discovered that in a number of places, the lab was unprotected by barriers, and that outsiders could walk right up to the building housing these deadly pathogens.”
 
“Around back, they watched and took notes as a pedestrian simply strolled into the building through an unguarded loading dock,” the report said.
 
At a second lab, in San Antonio, Tex., investigators “discovered that the security camera covered only a portion of the perimeter,” and that the guards were “unarmed,” commission said.
 
“Once again, these individuals walked the perimeter. This time they spotted a window through which, standing outside, they could watch the scientists as they worked with top-security pathogens,” the investigators noted. “Now they knew where the world’s most deadly pathogens were kept.”
 
After making their original findings, GAO asked that CDC collaborate with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which also has the ability to regulate such sites, in creating a baseline protocol for all BSL-4 labs, so that they would all meet the same security standards.
 
The new report noted that CDC, however, has taken only “limited action.”
 
“Although CDC has taken some modest steps for studying how to improve perimeter security controls for all BSL-4 labs,” GAO noted this week, “CDC has not established a detailed plan to implement our recommendation.”
 
Without a detailed plan from CDC on what corrective actions are planned, it is impossible to monitor CDC’s progress on implementing our recommendation to improve perimeter security controls for all BSL-4 labs.”
 
In lieu of guidance from CDC, the two offending laboratories instead took it upon themselves to improve security measures, including efforts to screen visitors, establishing a command-and-control center and improving video surveillance.
 
The CDC did frost the offending glass window and installed concrete planters on the curb as a “vehicle barricade,” and then created a committee to “prioritize” other upgrades, the report noted.
 
Still, the labs only have about half of the GAO-backed measures in place – and only one of the five labs that GAO studied actually has all 15 measures in place, the report noted, largely because it is a military base and is subject to more stringent rules laid out by the U.S. Department of Defense.
 
Gregory D. Kutz, managing director of forensic audits and special investigations at GAO, testified on the report before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on September 22.
 
The committee chairman, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), noted at the hearing: “It’s hard not to conclude that we are still not properly prepared to counter the threat of a (WMD) attack against the United States, particularly the terrorist threat, despite measures taken after the 2001 anthrax attacks.”
 
Another committee member, Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) lamented the lack of attention paid to security issues as the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 recede further into history.
 
“If this hearing had occurred in 2002 we would have had a line outside,” she said. “But now it has drifted away from the front of people’s consideration.”
 
Lieberman, McCaskill and the committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), have introduced the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act (S. 1649), a bill that would enhance bio-security measures and emergency response preparations for a WMD attack.
 
In response to the report, the latest in a series of three detailing security problems at BSL-4 labs, the CDC has said it will review the GAO guidance and hire a Security Officer to further assess the situation.
 
Von Roebuck, a spokesman for the Centers for Disease Control, told CNSNews.com that the government agency has already taken steps to make lab security upgrades a priority.
 
“CDC recognizes the importance of physical security and it is evaluated as one part of a comprehensive security system designed to prevent theft, loss, or release of select agents by insiders and outsiders,” he said.
 
“CDC, in our regulatory oversight, requires entities to have a multi-tiered system, based on a local risk assessment that is designed to protect against the entire spectrum of security threats.”